Azerbaijan is reassessing its long relationship with Russia as Moscow’s war in Ukraine reduces its ability to dominate the South Caucasus.

For decades, Baku treated Russia in two ways: as a powerful neighbor offering trade, transport links and employment opportunities, and as a regional hegemon capable of threatening Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. The war in Ukraine has shifted the balance between those two views.

Moscow’s regional influence weakens

Russia emerged from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war as the principal broker between Azerbaijan and Armenia, deploying peacekeepers and overseeing a new regional security arrangement. But after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow had fewer troops, less diplomatic attention and less political capacity available for the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan moved quickly as that Russian-led order weakened. Russian peacekeepers withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2024, while later diplomacy between Armenia and Azerbaijan increasingly involved the United States rather than Moscow.

Cooperation and tension continue

Baku has not abandoned cooperation with Russia. Trade, energy routes, the North–South transport corridor and the large Azerbaijani community living in Russia give both governments strong reasons to keep relations working.

At the same time, several disputes have hardened public attitudes. These include the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft over the North Caucasus, arrests involving Azerbaijani diaspora figures in Russia and Baku’s closure of Russian media outlets.

A more independent foreign policy

Azerbaijan is widening its diplomatic and economic options through closer coordination with Türkiye, new links across Central Asia and selective engagement with Washington, the European Union and China. The goal is not a complete break with Moscow but a strategy of selective cooperation that limits Russian leverage.

The central challenge for Baku is turning its greater room for maneuver into a durable foreign policy without triggering a new cycle of confrontation. Russia is less able to impose a comprehensive regional order, but it still retains the ability to apply pressure and disrupt Azerbaijan’s interests.

Based on analysis by Shujaat Ahmadzada published by the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs on June 6, 2026.